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Abstract: Gettier cases have played a major role in Anglo-American analytic epistemology over 
the past fifty years. Philosophers have grouped a bewildering array of examples under the head-
ing “Gettier case.” Philosophers claim that these cases are obvious counterexamples to the “tradi-
tional” analysis of knowledge as justified true belief, and they treat correctly classifying the 
cases as a criterion for judging proposed theories of knowledge. Cognitive scientists recently be-
gan testing whether philosophers are right about these cases. It turns out that philosophers were 
partly right and partly wrong. Some Gettier cases are obvious examples of ignorance, but others 
are obvious examples of knowledge. It also turns out that much research in this area of philoso-
phy is marred by thought-experimenter bias, invented historical claims, dysfunctional categoriza-
tion of examples, and mischaracterization by philosophers of their own intuitive judgments about 
particular cases. Despite these shortcomings, lessons learned from studying Gettier cases are 
leading to important insights about knowledge and knowledge attributions, which are central 
components of social cognition.
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Introduction
We are essentially social beings motivated to gather and retain information about other people 
(Lieberman 2013). Knowledge looms large in social cognition. Indeed, it looms largest. “Know” 
i s the most commonly used men ta l s t a te ve rb in the Eng l i sh l anguage 
(http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/words/the-oec-facts-about-the-language). In some corpuses 
of young children’s speech, “know” features in 75% of mental state attributions (Shatz, Wellman 
and Silber 1983). Knowledge sets the standard for appropriate assertion and recent evidence sug-
gests that it might also set the standard for appropriate belief and decision-making (Turri 2014; 
Turri in preparation; Turri under review a; Turri under review b; Turri and Buckwalter under re-
view; Buckwalter and Turri 2014). Governments spend hundreds of millions of dollars to support 
the creation, transfer, and “mobilization” of knowledge (e.g. http://www.sshrc-crsh.gc.ca/about-
au_sujet/facts-faits/budget-eng.aspx). Knowledge matters.
Reflecting knowledge’s importance, one main goal of philosophy is to help understand 
knowledge. According to some textbooks, traditionally philosophers defined knowledge as justi-
fied true belief (Chisholm 1989, 90; BonJour 2002, 43; Shope 2002, 29; Feldman 2003, 15; 
Pritchard 2013, 23). However, to the best of my knowledge, no evidence supports this grand his-
torical claim and it is just a myth that this definition was traditionally popular (compare 
Plantinga 1993, 6-7). Some authors tentatively cite a passage in Plato’s Meno (97e-98) as “per-
haps” endorsing the definition (Gettier 1963, 121, n. 1; Moser 2010, 771-772), but this is highly 
misleading because the passage does no such thing. But, to return to the fictitious textbook narra-
tive, in 1963 a short paper, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” shattered the allegedly tradi-
tional view. The paper included two cases that the author, Edmund Gettier, claimed were ex-
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amples of justified true belief without knowledge (Gettier 1963). Gettier did not argue for this 
claim. Rather, he said, the examples simply “show” that the traditional view is false.
Thought-experimenter bias
Another short paper was published in 1963, “The Effect of Experimenter Bias on the Perform-
ance of the Albino Rat.” The paper began with the observation, “That an experimenter can very 
easily influence his subjects to give him the response he wants is a problem that every investig-
ator recognizes and takes precautions to avoid” (Rosenthal and Fode 1963, 183). Philosophers 
have created a dizzying array of “Gettier case” thought experiments. In doing so, many have 
been guilty of experimenter bias. This includes some original players who helped set the agenda 
for decades to come. I provide two examples.
Gettier’s original cases are stilted and tendentiously described. One of them involved 
Smith, who has known his friend Jones for a long time (Gettier 1963, 122-3). During this time 
Jones has always owned a Ford and Smith just saw Jones driving a Ford. Smith of course be-
lieves, reasonably, that Jones owns a Ford. Next we are to “imagine” that Smith — weirdly and 
for no stated reason — selects “at random” some “place-names” to associate with his other 
friend, Brown, “of whose whereabouts he is totally ignorant.” This leads Smith to realize that if 
Jones owns a Ford, then either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona. So Smith concludes 
— very unnaturally and even though he “of course has no idea where Brown is” — that either 
Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona. Smith reasons similarly — and equally unnaturally 
and pointlessly — to the conclusions that either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Boston, and 
that either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk. Despite the unnaturalness and point-
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lessness of these inferences, Gettier tells us that Smith is “completely justified” in making them. 
Finally we are to “imagine” two further additions to the story: Jones does not currently own a 
Ford but instead is driving a rental, and Brown “happens really to be” in Barcelona. The case 
ends with Gettier telling us that “Smith does not know” that either Jones owns a Ford or Brown 
is in Barcelona, even though Smith has a justified true belief that either Jones owns a Ford or 
Brown is in Barcelona.
Another influential case from early in the literature also focuses on Ford ownership (Lehrer 
1965, 169-170). The agent in this example, Keith, has an “honest and reliable” friend named 
“Mr. Nogot.” Nogot gets out of a new Ford, walks into Keith’s office, tells Keith that he has “just 
purchased the car,” and — weirdly — “shows [Keith] a certificate that states that he owns the 
Ford.” On this basis, Keith believes, reasonably, “Mr. Nogot, who is in my office, owns a Ford.” 
Then Keith deduces, “Someone in my office owns a Ford.” Despite the unnaturalness and appar-
ent pointlessness of this inference, we are told that Keith is “completely justified” in making it.  
We are then told that Mr. Nogot has “deceived” Keith and does not own a Ford. We are left to 
guess why Mr. Nogot, honest and reliable friend that he is, would do this. Nevertheless, Keith 
also sees another person in his office, “Mr. Havit,” who does own a Ford. But Keith has “no 
evidence that [Mr. Havit] owns a Ford.” Thus it is true that someone in Keith’s office owns a  
Ford. However, we are told, Keith “do[es] not know that it is true.”
Despite the stilted and tendentious presentation of these cases, arguably we can still detect 
the relevant underlying structure. It involves a person with imperfect but impressive evidence for 
thinking that a certain proposition is true. This person notices that this first proposition entails a 
second proposition, which he concludes is true. And it is true. However, the impressive evidence 
4
he began with turns out to be misleading and he never detected that the first proposition is true. 
In fact, the first proposition is false. Now we are to decide two things. First, does the person have 
a justified true belief that the second proposition is true? Second, does the person know that the 
second proposition is true? If our answers are “yes” and “no,” respectively, then we are commit-
ted to denying that knowledge is equivalent to justified true belief. Others have recently made 
serious unbiased attempts to test cases structured this way. I discuss the results below.
First put your own house in order
One philosopher labeled Gettier’s paper “Gettier’s survey” (Jackson 2011, 480-1). Gettier’s sur-
vey “invited” philosophers “to agree with his intuition” that the examples were not cases of 
knowledge (Jackson 1998, 28). As the literature developed, nearly all published contributors 
agreed with Gettier’s intuition. Only a few “holdouts” resisted (Jackson 2011, 468). During this 
time, Gettier cases have served as a litmus test for theories of knowledge. If a proposed theory of 
knowledge implies that the subject in a Gettier case has knowledge, then the theory is disquali-
fied (see Shope 1983; Turri 2012a). Similarly, a theory of knowledge is expected to explain why 
a Gettier subject does not know (see Goldman 1967; Harman 1973; Zagzebski 1996; Sosa 2007; 
Greco 2010; Turri 2011).
The description of Gettier’s “survey” is inaccurate and misleading. Gettier did not “invite” 
philosophers to share his intuition. He used language apt to prime attributions of ignorance. He 
confidently and unqualifiedly inserted his own verdict into the description of the case. In short, 
he manipulated his audience. Others followed his example. The manipulation might have been 
unconscious, as experimenter bias often is, but its effect is the same.
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Recently when confronted with experimental evidence — discussed below — that generally 
people might not share Gettier’s intuition, philosophers have worried that the experiments are 
“defective” or do not meet “high” methodological standards for social science research (Jackson 
2011). These are legitimate concerns. However, philosophers overlook that the concerns apply 
equally to their own thought experiments. In particular, they apply to Gettier’s original “survey,” 
which was miserably designed and conducted. Relatedly, some philosophers have wondered 
whether non-philosophers “competently enough assess” Gettier cases (Turri 2013, 2). But given 
the evident experimenter bias in the Gettier genre, these philosophers should be equally con-
cerned whether their own assessment was sufficiently competent in the first place. At the very 
least, we should want to see the results of unbiased studies with proper controls before assuming 
that philosophers set the standard by which non-philosophers’ competence should be judged.
Questionable consensus
It is actually not known whether most philosophers agree with Gettier’s intuition. No relevant 
empirical study has been published. The vast majority of opinion expressed in professional pub-
lications does agree with Gettier’s intuition (dissenters include Sartwell 1991, Hetherington 2013 
and, in a qualified way, Turri 2012b). But from this we should not automatically infer that most 
philosophers share Gettier’s intuition, for at least two reasons.
First, and somewhat speculatively, there is a possible gatekeeper effect. The speculation is 
based on my own experience, which might not be representative. I have published many philo-
sophy papers related to Gettier cases. The peer review process tends to be random and hostile to 
begin with (Smith 2006). But early in my career the strongest and most dismissive hostility I 
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faced came in response to arguments that questioned Gettier’s original intuition (ultimately ap-
pearing as Turri 2012b). I persevered but can imagine giving up due to frustration or demoraliza-
tion. Gettier’s paper and many other influential early contributions appeared in the journals Ana-
lysis and Journal of Philosophy. That is mainly where the literature gained momentum and 
reached a critical intellectual mass. A small group of like-minded editors and anonymous referees 
could have ensured that published contributions agreed on the founding assumption that Gettier’s 
intuition was correct. Early attempts to express alternative intuitions or opposing arguments 
could have been dismissed on the grounds that the authors “just didn’t get it.” Of course, no in-
tentional covert conspiracy existed. None of these people colluded for this specific purpose.
Second, there is a possible selection effect. Once an assumption is firmly rooted in a philo-
sophical debate, the costs of challenging it are high. You may assume without penalty that Get-
tier’s intuition is correct, but you must argue mightily to defend the contrary assumption. Savvy 
researchers who do not share the intuition will direct their energy elsewhere. For the most part 
only researchers who share or at least grant the sacred assumption will participate in the discus-
sion. Over time this affects how the theory of knowledge is taught. Eventually students will learn 
from resources that take the Gettier intuition for granted and treat “the Gettier problem” with ut-
most seriousness. Students who have different intuitions about the cases or see the problem as 
trivial will specialize in another area of philosophy or another discipline. Only those committed 
to playing the game, or at least willing to play along, make it all the way through graduate school 
and publish on the topic (compare Buckwalter and Stich 2014). If someone breaks protocol and 
seriously argues against the intuition, they are “not invited to the next conference” (Lycan 2006, 
165, n. 22). Agreement achieved by including only like-minded participants has no probative 
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value.
There is also positive evidence that philosophers tend to attribute knowledge in some Get-
tier cases, which I will discuss more below. On the one hand, philosophers are people too, so if  
the vast majority of people attribute knowledge in certain Gettier cases, then philosophers prob-
ably share this intuition. And it turns out that the vast majority of people do attribute knowledge 
in certain Gettier cases. On the other hand, some philosophers claim that certain things are obvi-
ous about some Gettier cases, which imply that the agent in the case has knowledge. In particu-
lar, philosophers claim that the agent in a Gettier case obviously should make certain assertions 
(see below for more discussion and citations). But one should make an assertion only if one 
knows that it is true. So it follows that there is knowledge in these Gettier cases.
Even if we assume, contrary to the evidence, that most philosophers agree with Gettier’s in-
tuition, two facts diminish the significance of this “expert” consensus. On the one hand, there is 
the problem of experimenter bias, illustrated above. This problem could be responsible for some 
of the agreement, though how much cannot be known. Manipulated agreement has no probative 
value (compare Swain, Alexander and Weinberg 2008, 145-146). Second, there is the effect of 
conformism (Asch 1956; Bond and Smith 1996). For decades young philosophers have been in-
troduced to Gettier cases in a context where, they are told, everyone shares the Gettier intuition. 
The perception of consensus can cause us to express agreement even when doing so contradicts 
the way things appear to our senses. If, as Solomon Asch wrote, “the tendency of conformity in 
our society [is] so strong that reasonably intelligent and well-meaning young people are willing 
to call white black,” then presumably it is strong enough that they are willing to call knowledge 
ignorance (Asch 1955, 34). Philosophers are people too, and there is no evidence that they are 
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less susceptible to conformism than the average person is. Agreement due to low-level conform-
ist mechanisms has questionable probative value.
Experimental studies of Gettier cases
Cognitive scientists recently began seriously investigating knowledge judgments (for some over-
views, see Pinillos 2011; Beebe 2012; Alexander 2012; Beebe 2014). This work has studied a 
variety of scenarios, including Gettier cases. The first study of Gettier cases was motivated by 
work in psychology showing important cultural differences in reasoning styles and moral judg-
ments (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, and Norenzayan 2001; Haidt, Koller, and Dias 1993). Researchers 
tested a story about car ownership on U.S. undergraduates from a variety of cultural back-
grounds. The story was similar to some cases from the early Gettier literature, but it was phrased 
much more naturally and unbiasedly. Approximately 25% of those with Western backgrounds at-
tributed knowledge but more than half of those with eastern or southern Asian backgrounds at-
tributed knowledge. The results fit nicely with prior cross-cultural work on other sorts of judg-
ment, but followup work has been unable to replicate this cultural difference when using the ex-
act same materials on undergraduates in the United States (Kim and Yuan under review), or when 
using modified materials and procedures to test residents of the U.S. and India (Turri 2013, sec-
tion 7). Instead this followup work has observed uniformly low rates of knowledge attribution of 
around 20%. Some of this work included minimally matched control conditions where people at-
tributed knowledge. Overall, then, existing evidence makes it likely that, for at least some Gettier 
cases, people deny knowledge because of the Gettier element.
Perhaps the most important study of Gettier cases distinguished between apparent and au-
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thentic evidence (Starmans and Friedman 2012). Apparent evidence is “evidence that appears to 
be informative about reality, but is not really,” whereas authentic evidence is, roughly, evidence 
that makes the belief true when based on it (Starmans and Friedman 2012, 280). To illustrate the 
difference, consider two versions of a story about Corey, who collects coins in his piggy bank. 
One day Corey looks at a quarter he is putting into his bank and notices that it looks pretty old. 
He checks the date and reads “1936.” In the authentic-evidence version of the story, the coin is 
from 1936. In the apparent-evidence version it is from 1938 and part of the date has rubbed off. 
In each version there is already a 1936 quarter buried deep in the piggy bank, but Corey isn’t 
away of this other quarter. Then Corey takes a short nap, during which his roommate comes 
home, takes the quarter that Corey just deposited in the bank, and leaves. Corey wakes up soon 
after and doesn’t realize what his roommate did.
When Corey wakes up from his nap, does he know, or does he only believe, that there is a 
1936 coin in his piggy bank? People who read the authentic-evidence version tended to attribute 
knowledge, but people who read the apparent-evidence version tended to deny knowledge. The 
basic finding that people tend to deny knowledge in apparent evidence cases has been replicated 
(Turri 2013, section 2), and so has the finding that people tend to attribute knowledge in authen-
tic evidence cases (Nagel, San Juan, and Mar 2013, in light of Starmans and Friedman 2013, 
664; Turri, Buckwalter, and Blouw in press).
This raises an important question. A wide range of thought experiments are labelled “Get-
tier cases” in contemporary epistemology. There might be as many Gettier cases as authors who 
have written on the topic. What, if anything, do these cases have in common? Some philosophers 
have recognized that the label “Gettier case” masks radical diversity and, accordingly, claimed 
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that not all Gettier cases should be handled the same way (e.g. Lycan 2006; Turri 2011, 8). But 
the point is both understated and not well enough appreciated. The finding on authentic versus 
apparent evidence forces the point front and center.
Building on the apparent/authentic distinction, more recent work has shown that the struc-
ture of  Gettier cases differ in at least three important ways (Turri, Buckwalter, and Blouw in 
press; Blouw, Buckwalter, and Turri in press). First, many differ in whether the agent initially  
perceives a state of affairs that makes his or her belief true (a “truth-maker,” for short). In some 
examples, the agent perceives a truth-maker, but in others the agent perceives a convincing fake 
or something which seems to entail that the relevant proposition is true. Second, many examples 
differ in whether the agent’s perceptual relation remains intact throughout. Sometimes the agent 
perceives a certain truth-maker and events threaten to disrupt that truth-maker, but the threat ulti-
mately fails. Other times the threat succeeds in disrupting the original truth-maker, which is then 
replaced by a “backup” truth-maker. Third, many examples differ in how similar the perceived 
truth-maker and backup truth-maker are. Sometimes they very closely resemble one another, 
while other times they differ greatly.
Consider four specific cases from recent debates in philosophy and psychology.
(Barn) Henry and his son are driving through the country. Henry pulls over to 
stretch his legs, and while doing so tells his son a list of items currently in view along 
the roadside. “That’s a tractor. That’s a combine. That’s a horse. That’s a silo. And 
that’s a fine barn,” Henry added, pointing to the nearby roadside barn, which is indeed 
very fine. But Henry is unaware that the locals recently replaced nearly every barn in 
the county with papier-mâché fake barns. Henry is looking at the one real barn in the 
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whole county. (Adapted from Goldman 1976).
(Pen) Katie is in her locked apartment writing a letter. She puts the letter and her 
blue Bic pen down on her coffee table. Then she goes into the bathroom to take a 
shower. As Katie’s shower begins, two burglars silently break into the apartment. One 
burglar takes Katie’s blue Bic pen from the table. But the other burglar absent-
mindedly leaves his own identical blue Bic pen on the coffee table. Then the burglars 
leave. Katie is still in the shower and did not hear anything. (Starmans and Friedman 
2012, 276)
(Husband) Mary enters the house and looks into the living room. A familiar ap-
pearance greets her from her husband’s chair. She thinks, “My husband is sitting in the 
living room,” and then walks into the den. But Mary misidentified the man in the 
chair. It’s not her husband but his brother, whom she had no reason to think was even 
in the country. However, her husband is seated along the opposite wall of the living 
room, out of Mary’s sight, dozing in a different chair. (Adapted from Zagzebski 1996)
(Barcelona) Smith has strong evidence that Jones owns a Ford. Smith has an-
other friend, Brown, of whose whereabouts he is totally ignorant. On the basis of his 
evidence about Jones, Smith accepts the proposition that “Either Jones owns a Ford, 
or Brown is in Barcelona,” even though he has no idea where Brown is. It turns out 
that Jones does not own a Ford and is presently driving a rented car. However, by the 
sheerest coincidence and entirely unknown to Smith, Brown is traveling in Barcelona. 
(Adapted from Gettier 1963)
These cases exhibit the three important differences noted above. First, in Barn and Pen the 
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agent initially perceives a truth-maker, but this does not happen in either Husband or Barcelona. 
Second, in Barn the agent’s perceptual relation to the truth-maker remains intact throughout, des-
pite the threat, made salient to the reader, that he could have perceptually misidentified the relev-
ant item. By contrast, in Pen the truth-maker is not only threatened but also disrupted and re-
placed, thereby changing the explanation for why the agent’s belief is true. Third, in Husband, 
even though the agent does not perceive the truth-maker, her belief is nevertheless made true by 
a state of affairs that very closely resembles the state of affairs which she thinks makes her belief 
true. By contrast, in Barcelona the agent’s belief is made true by a state of affairs that differs 
greatly from the one that he thinks makes his belief true. In other words, the “backup” truth-
maker in Husband is very similar to what the agent had in mind, whereas in Barcelona it is very 
dissimilar. Despite these differences, all four examples pass for “Gettier cases” in the literature. It 
would be astonishing if these differences didn’t affect knowledge judgments.
The differences do affect knowledge judgments, as a recent study vividly illustrates (Turri, 
Buckwalter, and Blouw in press, Experiment 4). Participants read one of seven versions of a 
story. One version was a “knowledge control,” intended to elicit very high rates of knowledge at-
tribution. Another version was an “ignorance control,” intended to elicit very low rates of know-
ledge attribution. The other five versions combined different permutations of the three structural 
variables noted above. The basic storyline featured an agent, Emma, admiring jewelry in a fancy 
department store. Emma purchases a stone from the diamond display, puts it in her pocket, 
browses for another minute, then leaves the store. The different versions of the story vary 
whether the stone is a real diamond or a fake, whether there is a threat to the stone remaining in 
Emma’s pocket, whether the threat fails or succeeds, and whether any other stone also ends up in 
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Emma’s pocket. In the terminology introduced above, the different versions manipulated whether 
Emma detects an initial truth-maker for her belief that there is a diamond in her pocket as she 
leaves the store, whether Emma’s truth-detection is saliently threatened, whether the threat suc-
ceeds in disrupting the initial truth-maker, and whether the backup truth-maker is highly similar 
or dissimilar to the initial.
In all versions, Emma purchases a stone from a jewelry store, puts it in her pocket, and soon 
walks out of the store. In all the stories that involve detection, the stone she purchases is a dia-
mond. In all the stories that do not involve detection, the stone is a fake. In all the stories that in-
volve similar backup truth-makers, the backup truth-maker is that, one way or another, a dia-
mond is put into Emma’s pocket before she leaves the store. In all the stories that involve dissim-
ilar backup truth-makers, the backup truth-maker is that a real diamond was secretly sewn into 
Emma’s pocket by a previous owner long ago. Table 1 summarizes the seven versions of the 
story.
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Table 1. Description of the seven versions of the story (from Turri, Buckwalter, and Blouw in 
press, Experiment 4).
Condition Description
1. Knowledge Control The stone Emma purchases is a diamond. She walks out of the store 
and nothing else happens.
2. Failed Threat The stone Emma purchases is a diamond. A skilled jewel thief tries 
to steal it from her pocket before she leaves the store, but he fails.
3. Detection Similar 
Replacement
The stone Emma purchases is a diamond. A skilled jewel thief tries 
to steal it from her pocket before she leaves the store, and he 
succeeds. Someone secretly slips a diamond into Emma’s pocket 
before she leaves the store.
4. Detection Dissimilar 
Replacement
The stone Emma purchases is a diamond. A skilled jewel thief tries 
to steal it from her pocket before she leaves the store, and he 
succeeds. Long ago, Emma’s grandmother secretly sewed a diamond 
into the pocket of Emma’s coat.
5. No Detection Similar 
Replacement
The stone Emma purchases is a fake. A skilled jewel thief tries to 
steal it from her pocket before she leaves the store, and he succeeds. 
Someone secretly slips a diamond into Emma’s pocket before she 
leaves the store.
6. No Detection Dissimilar 
Replacement
The stone Emma purchases is a fake. A skilled jewel thief tries to 
steal it from her pocket before she leaves the store, and he succeeds. 
Long ago, Emma’s grandmother secretly sewed a diamond into the 
pocket of Emma’s coat.
7. Ignorance Control The stone Emma purchases is a fake. She walks out of the store and 
nothing else happens.
Some researchers would count stories 2-6 all as Gettier cases, or at least clear cases of justi-
fied true belief without knowledge (e.g. Goldman 1967, 1976; Sosa 1991, 238-239; Zagzebski 
1996, 283-285; Pritchard 2005; Greco 2010, chapter 5). Story 2 is structurally similar to the infa-
mous “fake barn” case, and story 6 is structurally similar to some very early Gettier cases. But 
people judged the stories very differently, as illustrated in Figure 1. Rates of knowledge attribu-
tion for story 2 were very high (over 80%) and did not differ from rates observed for the knowl-
edge control story. By contrast, rates of knowledge for story 6 were extremely low (under 20%) 
and did not differ from rates observed for the ignorance control story. Rates for the other three 
stories fell somewhere in between. Researchers replicated this same basic pattern of results using 
different cover stories and procedures.
Fig. 1. Percent of participants attributing knowledge across conditions. Except where non-signi-
ficance is indicated, significance for all comparisons at the p < 0.01 level (from Turri, Buckwal-
ter, and Blouw in press, Experiment 4).
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If intuitions about Gettier cases vary this widely — from patterns matching cases of 
paradigmatic knowledge to patterns matching cases of paradigmatic ignorance — then “Gettier 
case” is a theoretically useless category. The fact that something is a Gettier case is consistent 
with its being both overwhelmingly judged knowledge and overwhelmingly judged ignorance.
Other applications
Research on Gettier cases has contributed to at least two other active areas in experimental phi-
losophy. The first area is the relationship between knowledge attributions and other sorts of eval-
uative judgment. Researchers recently discovered that non-epistemic evaluations can affect 
knowledge attributions in surprising ways. For example, people are more likely to attribute fore-
knowledge of a bad outcome than of a good outcome (Beebe and Buckwalter 2010). The basic 
finding has been extended and replicated many times (Beebe and Jensen 2012; Dalbauer and 
Hergovich 2013; Turri 2014). For present purposes, the most interesting extension concerns Get-
tier cases. When comparing Gettier cases that involve bad and good outcomes, researchers have 
found that people are more likely to attribute knowledge for bad outcomes (Beebe and Shea 
2013; Buckwalter 2013). This important finding suggests that knowledge might depend on fac-
tors that twentieth-century analytic epistemologists assumed were “non-epistemic.”
The second area is the norm of assertion. Assertion is ubiquitous, unavoidable and ex-
tremely important in human society. It is the central means of sharing information and coordinat-
ing actions. Unsurprisingly, then, researchers have taken a keen interest in the norm of assertion: 
under what conditions should you make an assertion? The correct answer is that you should as-
sert a proposition only if you know that it’s true. A wealth of theoretical and empirical evidence 
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supports the knowledge account (Turri in preparation). However, critics charge that the knowl-
edge account is counterintuitive and mischaracterizes our ordinary practice of evaluating asser-
tions. To support these charges, critics have tried to produce counterexamples to the knowledge 
account. One common strategy is to try to identify cases where we would ordinarily judge that 
assertability is present even though a necessary condition of knowledge is lacking. For example, 
critics have claimed that reasonable false beliefs are ordinarily judged to be assertable. But when 
researchers tested this claim, they found that it mischaracterizes how reasonable false assertions 
are actually evaluated (Turri 2013b; Turri and Blouw 2014).
An equally popular claim among critics is that “Gettiered” beliefs fall short of knowledge 
but, intuitively, there is no sense in which you should not assert them (e.g. Hill and Schechter 
2007; Lackey 2007; Smithies 2012; Coffman 2014; Pritchard 2014). But when researchers tested 
this claim, they found that it too mischaracterizes how Gettiered assertions are actually evaluated 
(Turri under review c). For example, in one experiment people read one of two versions of a 
story about a woman who sees a barn while driving with her son. In one version she is looking at  
the only “expensive barn” amidst many “cheap barns.” In the other version she is looking at the 
only “real barn” amidst many “fake barn facades.” At the end of the story her son points and asks 
if it is a barn. People were then asked to select which option best describes the agent:
• She knows that it’s a barn, and she should tell her son that it’s a barn.
• She knows that it’s a barn, and she should not tell her son that it’s a barn.
• She does not know that it’s a barn, and she should tell her son that it’s a barn.
• She does not know that it’s a barn, and she should not tell her son that it’s a barn.
People overwhelmingly selected one option as best: she knows that it’s a barn, and she 
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should tell her son that it’s a barn. Which version they read did not affect their response. In the 
“cheap barn” version 94% selected this option, as did 83% in the “fake barn” version. (For im-
portant related findings on knowledge attribution in fake barn cases, see Colaco, Buckwalter, 
Stich, and Machery 2014.) Across a variety of Gettier cover stories and different procedures for 
questioning participants, a very strong majority consistently responded by linking knowledge and 
assertability.
Knowledge attributions are social judgments and many aspects of social cognition, includ-
ing moral cognition, occur automatically and unconsciously (Bargh, Schwader, Hailey, Dyer & 
Boothby 2012; Haidt 2007). The overwhelming ratings of knowledge and assertability in fake 
barn cases suggest that some philosophers have been out of touch with their implicit assessment 
of such cases when they confidently claim that these are obvious examples of assertability with-
out knowledge. I propose the following hypothesis. These philosophers’ intuitions about asserta-
bility track their implicit judgments about knowledge, courtesy of their ordinary competence in 
applying that concept. It seems obvious that the agent should make the assertion because she ob-
viously knows. But contemporary philosophers have also been trained to say, perversely, that 
someone in “fake barn country” obviously lacks knowledge. So the default knowledge judgment 
is explicitly reversed. These philosophers do not realize that they are explicitly denying the intu-
itive basis for attributing assertability.
Conclusions
The philosophical literature and lore on Gettier cases is a vast and confusing labyrinth built ad-
ventitiously over many decades. Perhaps in an effort to lend credibility to their enterprise, 
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philosophers invented and nurtured a myth that the literature’s founder and namesake vanquished 
the “classical” definition of knowledge, extending all the way back to Plato, setting off a race to 
restore balance in the epistemological universe. Philosophers claim that it is obvious that Gettier 
cases are cases of ignorance. But from the very start this research program has suffered from 
thought-experimenter bias and it seems likely that philosophers have mischaracterized their own 
intuitive reaction to some key cases. The nominal category “Gettier case” includes a variety of 
cases with radical structural differences that are extremely important in both theory and ordinary 
practice — so important as to render the nominal category, as we have inherited it, utterly use-
less. Some Gettier cases elicit rates of knowledge attribution exceeding 80%, while others strug-
gle to top 20%. Thus the mere fact that something is a “Gettier case” is consistent with its being  
both overwhelmingly judged knowledge and overwhelmingly judged ignorance, depriving the 
category of any diagnostic or predictive value.
Philosophers can learn some important lessons from this saga. They should take precautions 
to avoid thought-experimenter bias in their research. They should stop grouping into one cate-
gory cases with radically different causal structures. They should be more careful before pro-
claiming consensus on an issue and more mindful of the possibility that they lack unproblematic 
transparent access to their intuitions and attitudes about cases (Carruthers 2011). That there is 
considerable room for improvement should not obscure the fact that reflecting on Gettier cases 
has produced valuable insights about the nature of knowledge and knowledge attributions. But 
the path to discovery was far longer and more difficult than it might have been. More rigorous 
methodology, humility, and interdisciplinary cooperation would have produced similar insights 
much more quickly and efficiently. To my mind, this is the most important lesson of all.
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